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Abstract. This paper uses inter-country panel data obtained during the period 1990 to 
2010 to examine how the occurrence of natural disasters has affected corruption within 
the public sector. There are a number of major findings from this study. (1) Natural 
disasters lead to corruption within the public sector. (2) Furthermore, disaggregating 
disasters into various categories for closer examination reveals that floods, which are 
foreseeable and affect victims that are limited to a particular group, increase 
corruption; however, other types of disasters do not have such a consequence. (3) The 
effect of floods is much greater in developed countries than in developing countries. 
These findings are observed even after considering the time trend, the various 
characteristics of the countries affected, and statistical outliers. In developed countries, 
people have an incentive to live within areas prone to flooding because the benefit 
expected from the occurrence of a flood is greater than its perceived cost. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The devastating damage caused by natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina in 
2005 and the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 has led researchers to address 
disaster-related issues (Eisensee & Strӧmberg 2007; Luechinger & Saschkly 2009). 
Disasters have been observed to have critical influence on modern society with regard 
to the political economy1. It has been shown that in addressing the damage caused by 
natural disasters, low-quality governance, characterized by corruption and income 
inequality, increases the death rate (Anbarci et al. 2005; Kahn 2005; Escaleras et al. 
2007)2. The occurrence of natural disasters appears to affect the cost and incentive 
structures faced by bureaucrats as well as individuals, which include the victims of the 
disasters. Public sector corruption is one of the major issues of concern when 
considering the interaction between politics and economics3 (e.g., Glaeser & Saks 
2006; Gokcekus 2008; Apergis et al. 2010; Dreher & Schneider 2010; Escaleras et al. 
2010; Johnson et al. 2011; Swaleheen 2011). Natural disasters possibly generate an 
incentive to practice corruption, which is generally defined as the use of public office 
for private gain (Boettke et al. 2007; Leeson & Sobel 2008). 
As observed in the United States, individuals abuse disaster relief windfalls. For 
instance, public employees were accused of soliciting bribes from relief-funded 
contractors and of overbilling the government (Leeson & Sobel 2008). Similarly, the 
misuse of reconstruction funds was revealed in the case of the Great East Japan 
Earthquake, when it was reported that “a special account budget to fund the 
reconstruction of communities devastated by the 3/11 earthquake, tsunami, and 
nuclear disasters has been used to pay for unrelated projects” (Japan Times 2012). For 
instance, some money earmarked for reconstruction work was spent improperly on 
projects to improve the earthquake resistance in buildings of the central government’s 
                                                   
1 In particular, after entering the 21st century, a growing number of researchers are 
attempting to investigate the impact of natural disasters on economic growth 
(Skidmore & Toya 2002; Strobl 2011), death toll (e.g., Anbarci et al. 2005; Kahn 2005; 
Toya & Skidmore 2007), and trust (Skidmore & Toya 2013). 
2 Public sector corruption is also observed to increase the frequency of technological 
disasters (Yamamura 2013). 
3 In part, because of the limitations of data on corruption, there are few empirical 
analyses of corruption before the 1990s, although a number of classical anecdotal and 
theoretical research works existed (Leff 1964; Lui 1985; Shleifer & Vishny 1993; Jain 
2001). The seminal work of Mauro (1995) was the first to explore empirically the 
effects of corruption. Subsequently, the number of empirical works on corruption have 
mushroomed (e.g., Anbarci et al. 2006; Glaeser and Saks 2006; Apergis et al. 2010; 
Dreher & Schneider 2010; Escaleras et al. 2010; Johnson et al. 2011; Swaleheen 2011). 
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local branch offices and on measures to deal with anti-whaling groups (Daily Yomiuri, 
2013). Such an undesirable situation can be explained within the framework of public 
choice theory as follows. Government is anticipated to play a leading role in 
reconstruction and so allocates a budget for that purpose. In this case, various groups 
related to public works attempt to receive orders from the government. However, 
because of information asymmetry or the support of favor-based politicians, groups are 
able to seek benefits even though their works are not associated with reconstruction. 
On the other hand, it has been observed that the occurrence of disasters gives 
politicians an incentive to misallocate disaster expenditure in order to increase the 
probability of their re-election (Garrett & Sobel 2003). Consequently, this allocative 
failure prevents disaster relief from reaching those who need it most (Sobel & Leeson 
2006).  
Empirical analysis of the impact of disasters on corruption is considered instructive 
for designing appropriate incentive schemes to deal with disasters. The seminal work 
of Leeson & Sobel (2008), based on the Panel data of the United States4, provided 
evidence that disaster relief windfalls increased corruption. They argued that the 
“disadvantageous location in the Gulf Coast where hurricanes and other bad weather 
are commonplace may be a large part for the reason why they have historically been 
more corrupt than states in the Great Plains” (Leeson & Sobel 2008, 678). There are 
various types of disaster and the existing literature claims that the different 
characteristics of disasters possibly influence the outcome (e.g., Skidmore & Toya 2002; 
Kahn 2005; Kellenberg & Mobarak 2008; Skidmore & Toya 2013). According to 
Skidmore and Toya, disasters should be divided into either climatic or geologic 
disasters because their characteristics are different. The argument of Leeson and Sobel 
(2008) is based on the assumption that disasters occur frequently within limited areas. 
This assumption is suitable for climatic disasters but not for geologic disasters, such as 
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions. However, in the paper of Leeson and Sobel (2008), 
proxies used for the degree of disaster are the number of natural disasters or disaster 
relief payments. Hence, it is not clear whether their assumption holds true because 
their data do not exclude the effects of geologic disasters. Therefore, to investigate the 
claims of Leeson and Sobel (2008) more closely, this paper investigates the effects of 
various types of disasters. Furthermore, it has been observed that the effect of natural 
disasters differs between developing and developed countries (Toya & Skidmore 2007; 
Cuaresma et al. 2008). Therefore, this paper compares the effects of each type of 
                                                   
4 Many works attempted to ascertain the determinants of corruption (Treisman 2000; 
Paldam 2001; Serra 2006; Pellegrini & Gerlagh 2008). 
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disaster. 
To a certain extent, the probability of the occurrence of disasters is considered 
exogenous, because it does not depend on the condition of human society. Hence, a test 
on the impact of disasters on corruption is thought to be the natural experiment. This 
paper attempts to investigate how natural disasters influence corruption within the 
public sector, by using panel data from 84 countries for a 21-year period obtained 
between 1990 and 2010. It is found that natural disasters lead the public sector to 
become corrupt. In addition, such a tendency is remarkable for floods, which are 
foreseeable and affect victims limited to a particular group. The effect of the disaster is 
greater in developed countries than in developing countries.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 proposes an overview 
of disasters and the hypotheses to be tested. The data and methods used are explained 
in section 3. Section 4 discusses the results of the estimations and the final section 
offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Hypotheses 
 
2.1. Overview of types of natural disaster 
This paper uses country-level panel data generally used in previous works (e.g., 
Anbarci et al. 2006; Skidmore & Toya 2013; Yamamura 2013). As will be explained 
later, the number of natural disasters in each country was sourced from EM-DAT 
(Emergency Events Database). In addition, this paper uses a proxy for public sector 
corruption, which is provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). This 
value ranges from 0 to 6—larger values indicate less corruption; i.e., this is regarded as 
incorruption. Figure 1 demonstrates the change in degree of incorruption and the 
occurrence of natural disasters. It shows that the occurrence of disasters tended to 
increase from 1992 to 2002 and then became constant, whereas incorruption decreased 
during this period. This trend suggests that the number of disasters has a negative 
association with the degree of incorruption prior to 2002. From the inter-country 
viewpoint, Figure 2 presents the average number of disasters on the horizontal axis 
and incorruption on the vertical axis for each county. The slope of the fitted line reveals 
a slightly negative association between them, indicating that natural disasters 
increase corruption. A similar relationship was also observed in the state-level data of 
the United States (Boettke et al. 2007; Leeson & Sobel 2008). 
The characteristics of disasters differ, and thus, the disaggregation of disasters into 
various types provides useful information, enabling closer analysis. Following existing 
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works (Skidmore & Toya 2002; Kahn 2005), disasters are classified into floods, storms, 
earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, and others5. Figure 3 shows that floods 
account for approximately 40% of natural disasters, 30% are storms, 7% are 
earthquakes, 2% are volcanic eruptions, and 5% are landslides. Thus, floods and 
storms account for around 70% of natural disasters, which can be categorized as 
climatic disasters (Skidmore & Toya 2002). Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and 
landslides can be categorized as geologic disasters (Skidmore & Toya 2002).  
In comparison with geologic disasters, “climatic disasters tend to occur more 
frequently and during a particular time of the year. In addition, forecasting makes it 
possible for agents to protect themselves by taking cover or evaluating the afflicted 
region” (Skidmore & Toya 2002, 671). Hence, climatic disasters are thought to be a 
threat to property but not to life. Average deaths per disaster are illustrated in Figure 
4. Deaths caused by earthquakes are about 1300, which is a significantly larger 
number than that caused by other disasters. Deaths caused by volcanic eruptions and 
landslides are about 15 and 50, respectively, and those caused by floods and storms are 
50 and 150, respectively. Hence, storms pose a relatively significant risk to life, 
whereas in comparison, volcanic eruptions, landslides, and floods are not that risky. 
Floods occur because of significant rises in water level. Therefore, people who reside 
on irrigated land and in areas near rivers, waterways, lakes, or reservoirs are at 
greatest risk from floods. Residents around the perimeter of active volcanoes face the 
greatest risk from volcanic eruptions. Landslides occur on hillsides and in 
mountainous districts. Hence, the risk from floods, volcanic eruptions, and landslides 
is limited to specific areas. On the other hand, storms and earthquakes can have an 
effect across much wider areas. Storms may have regular routes, but damage caused 
by storms could possibly be observed in areas of irrigated land, mountainous areas, 
and around volcanoes. If an earthquake occurs within an area with an active fault line, 
the damage could possibly extend to other areas. 
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of disasters. The expected death rate is 
considered very small for floods, volcanic eruptions, and landslides. Hence, even if 
these events occur frequently in a specific area, there is little incentive for the 
residents to move to safer areas. Among low-cost disasters, such as floods, volcanic 
eruptions, and landslides, the probability of occurrence is low for volcanic eruptions 
and landslides, whereas floods can occur frequently. This causes residents in 
flood-prone areas to anticipate that they have opportunities to receive compensation. 
                                                   
5 Empirical results of this paper do not change when other classifications are 
employed.  
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Thus, relief from natural disasters such as floods could possibly trigger a moral hazard 
problem.  
 
2.2. Hypotheses 
Countries with higher rents stemming from natural resources tend to have higher 
levels of corruption (Ades and Di Tella 1999). In a similar manner, the occurrence of 
natural disasters generates rents, which then increases corruption. According to the 
claims of Niskanen (1971), government bureaucrats seek to maximize the size of their 
budget, rather than deliver social benefit. Natural disasters possibly give bureaucrats 
the opportunity to increase their budget by using aid as a pretext. In the midst of a 
disaster, a government cannot observe the real situation in those areas affected. 
Information about the disaster is more abundant for the victims than for the 
government. Hence, there is information asymmetry regarding the damage caused by 
the disaster between the victims and the bureaucrats. Accordingly, victims can 
encourage the government to compensate excessively for damage caused by the 
disaster.  
Disaster-related benefits can be regarded as rents and as a consequence of disasters, 
victims under the influence of a bureaucrat enjoy the rents, and the value of 
controlling the rents is high. Hence, “bureaucrats can reap some of this value by 
surrendering their control rights in exchange for bribes” (Ades & Di Tella 1999, 983). 
Victims would pay bribes to obtain the rents if the cost of the bribe were sufficiently 
lower than the rents. Here, Hypothesis 1 is proposed.  
 
Hypothesis 1. 
Occurrence of natural disaster deteriorates public sector corruption. 
 
Life is thought to be more valuable than are physical assets. Hence, in addition to 
damage to physical assets, the probability of death is regarded as an expected cost of 
natural disasters. Furthermore, if the residents become victims, then they are likely to 
receive some disaster-related compensation from the government. The more frequently 
that disaster occurs, the higher the expected disaster-related benefit. Individuals 
select a residential area by comparing the expected benefits and the expected costs. 
This inference is consistent with the claim that “people who voluntarily put themselves 
in harm’s way,” are “taking on the additional risk of living and working in 
disaster-prone areas,” and of “adequately insuring their lives” (Shughart II 2006, p.44). 
Thus, individuals reside in disaster-prone areas if the perceived benefit of residing 
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there outweighs the cost. This leads to the proposal of Hypothesis 2: 
 
Hypothesis 2: 
Corruption increases when disasters frequently occur; however, its cost is low. 
 
3. Data and method 
 
3.1. Data  
Data regarding the number of natural disasters were sourced from EM-DAT 
(Emergency Events Database). 6  As shown in Figure 1 and discussed earlier, an 
increasing trend in the number of disasters over time is observed. Concerning the 
trend, there is an argument that “we should pay attention to the possibility that the 
reported increase is partly due to an increased tendency to report, not necessarily an 
increase in the occurrence of disasters” (Kurosaki 2013, p.2). The windfalls generated 
by foreign aid possibly lead recipient countries to adopt opportunistic behavior such as 
rent-seeking activities, which impede institutional quality (Ades, & Di Tella 1999; 
Svensson 2000; Djankov et al. 2008). It has been suggested that in developing 
countries, the reporting of the impact of natural disasters tends to be exaggerated for 
the purposes of obtaining international aid from developed countries (Albala-Bertrand 
1993; Skidmore & Toya 2002). Inevitably, measurement errors cause some degree of 
bias in the estimations in developing countries. Measurement error is less likely to 
exist in developed countries. Hence, estimation error seems trivial when the sample is 
limited to developed countries. Dividing the sample into developed and developing 
countries facilitates the avoidance of measurement error when estimations are 
conducted. As demonstrated in Figure 2, the number of disasters in the United States 
is significantly larger than in other countries, even though it is a developed country. 
Garret and Sobel (2003) made it evident that disaster declaration and the level of 
disaster expenditure are both politically motivated rather than driven by the severity 
or frequency of disaster. This is because of the system of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), which is concerned with the disaster declaration process 
and the subsequent allocation of disaster relief money. It is important for the President 
to manipulate disaster declaration with the aim of being re-elected. Thus, “the vast 
majority of disasters declared over the last decade have been for weather events that 
most people would not consider disasters at all” (Sobel & Leeson 2006, 60). Canada is a 
                                                   
6 Natural disaster data were gathered from the International Disaster Database. 
http://www.emdat.be (accessed on August 25, 2013). 
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developed country that is part of the North American continent, and has a land area of 
about 9900000 km2, which is similar to that of the United States (about 9600000 km2). 
Despite the similarities shared by the United States and Canada, based on the data 
used in this paper, the average number of total disasters is 24.5 for the United States 
and 3.0 for Canada. Such a remarkable difference might be too large to be explained by 
political factors such as the system of FEMA. In addition to the United States, 
countries with a total number of disasters over 10 can be regarded as outliers. 
Therefore, they are removed from the sample in order to reduce measurement errors 
and improve the robustness. 
With respect to the proxy for public sector corruption, the index of the ICRG is used, 
which is assembled by the Political Risk Service Group. The values range from 0 
(corrupt) to 6 (incorrupt), and can be regarded as indicating the degree of incorruption. 
The data of the ICRG reveal that corruption experienced directly in business is 
commonplace. The index is appropriate for capturing financial corruption in the form 
of demands for special payments and bribes. Integrating the disaster and corruption 
data leads the panel data to include 84 countries over a 21-year period (1990–2010). In 
addition to the key variables above, control variables such as GDP per capita, 
population, government size, and land area are collected from the World Bank (2010). 
In this paper, members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) are considered as developed countries, while non-members of the 
OECD are classed as developing countries. A comparison of the basic statistics for the 
variables between the OECD and the non-OECD countries is presented in Table 2. 
“Flooding in one region can be the result of storm activity upstream” (Skidmore & Toya 
2013, 12). Storms are often accompanied by floods. Based on the data set of this paper, 
the correlation coefficient between floods and storms is 0.47. It is interesting to observe 
that the number of storms is 1.62 in OECD countries and 0.55 in non-OECD countries, 
whereas the number of floods is 0.91 in OECD countries and 1.08 in non-OECD 
countries. This shows that storms are less likely to cause floods in developed countries 
than in developing countries. One possible interpretation is that the inappropriate 
irrigation systems may make the system vulnerable to storms, increasing the 
probability of floods. In OECD countries, the maintenance of appropriate irrigation 
systems is thought to reduce floods. 
Consistent with intuition, the value of incorruption in OECD countries is 4.70, 
which is larger than 2.60, the value for non-OECD countries. That is, OECD countries 
are less corrupt than non-OECD countries. Similarly, concerning GDP per capita, 
schooling years, and degree of democracy, these values are larger for OECD than for 
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non-OECD countries. This can be interpreted as a reflection of the degree of economic 
development. With respect to religion, the ratio of Protestants is larger in OECD 
countries than in non-OECD countries, which reinforces the argument that Protestant 
countries are less corrupt (Gokcekus 2008). 
 
3.2. Basic methods 
 
To examine Hypothesis 1, the estimated function takes the following form:  
Incorruptionit = 0 + 1 Number of disasters it + 2 Number of disasters it-1 + 3GDPit 
+ 4Populationit + 5land areait +6Time trend t + X’B+ ui +εit,             (1) 
 
where the dependent variable is Incorruption it in country i for year t,  represents the 
regression parameters, ui represents the unobservable feature of country i, and εit 
represents the error term. “Public sector corruption is commonly known to be highly 
correlated with … omitted institutional factors” (Escaleras et al. 2007, p. 219). To 
capture this, the function includes X, which represents the vector of additional control 
variables including institutional, social, and cultural factors. Furthermore, as shown 
in Figure 1, time trends are thought to influence the results, and hence, time tends are 
also captured following the method of Kahn (2005). 
As for Incorruption, its lower and upper bounds are 0 and 6, respectively. Therefore, 
values are left-censored at 0 and right-censored at 6. In the data used, 19 observations 
are left-censored and 94 observations are right-censored. Therefore, in this study, the 
Tobit model is used for estimations. Furthermore, even after controlling various 
country-specific factors by X, unobservable country-specific characteristics ui exist. 
Hence, with the aim of controlling for ui, the random effect Tobit model is used.7 
Furthermore, Figure 1 suggests the possibility that the third factors are related to both 
incorruption and natural disasters. If the relation between disasters and incorruption 
is caused completely by the third factors, the relation is spurious, and thus, the 
hypothesis cannot be supported. Hence, following the method of Kahn (2005), the time 
trend is included to exclude the effects of the third factors.  
Obviously, the effect of a natural disaster in year t on incorruption in year t changes 
according to the date of occurrence of the disaster. If a disaster occurs at the end of year 
t, the incorruption in year t has been estimated already, and thus, the disaster has no 
                                                   
7 Leeson & Sobel (2008) used the simple fixed effects model when the effect of disaster 
relief on corruption is examined. Results reported in the present paper do not change 
when the simple fixed effects model is used. The results using the fixed effects model 
are available upon request. 
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effect on the level of the incorruption. However, the disaster will influence the level of 
incorruption in year t+1. As found in the case of the United States, there is a time lag 
between the influx of disaster relief and the increase in corruption (Leeson & Sobel, 
2008). Therefore, to capture the time lag effect of disasters, natural disasters in year t 
and natural disasters in year t-1 are incorporated as independent variables. If 
Hypothesis 1 is supported, the number of disasters t and the number of disasters t-1 will 
take a negative sign. The slightly negative correlation observed in Figure 2 is 
congruent with Hypothesis 1. The relation, however, seems to be influenced by outliers 
such as the United States, China, India, Philippines, and Indonesia. Furthermore, in 
examining Hypothesis 2, the effects of specific types of disaster should be identified. 
Hence, instead of the number of total disasters, disaggregated numbers of disasters are 
incorporated.  
With regard to control variables, GDP and POP are included to capture basic 
economic conditions. The larger the land size is, the higher the probability of the 
occurrence of natural disasters, if all other things are equal. For the purposes of 
controlling for it, land size is included as an independent variable. Existing works have 
made it evident that institutional and socio-economic conditions are related closely to 
the outcomes of natural disasters (Kahn 2005; Toya and Skidmore 2007). For instance, 
it was found that legal origin, ethnic heterogeneity, and religion determine the level of 
corruption (e.g., Treisman 2000; Paldam 2001; Djankov et al. 2003; Serra 2006; 
Gokcekus 2008; Pellegrini & Gerlagh 2008). In this paper, in order to capture this, 
French and English legal origin dummies are used and the ratio of the population that 
is Protestant in taken as in 1980. These data were sourced from an earlier work (La 
Porta et al. 1999).8 Previous studies found that the public sector is more inclined to be 
corrupt in those countries of French legal origin that are now regarded as civil law 
countries (Treisman 2000; Serra 2006). It has been suggested that the public sector is 
less likely to be corrupt in countries in which Protestants are dominant (Gokcekus 
2008).  
 
4. Results 
 
The estimations results based on the full sample are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The 
results based on the sample of non-OECD countries are presented in Tables 5 and 6, 
and those based on the sample of OECD countries are displayed in Tables 7 and 8. The 
                                                   
8 It is available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset 
(Accessed on May 1, 2011). 
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key variables of Tables 3, 5, and 7 are the number of total natural disasters in year t 
and in year t-1. The key variables of Tables 4, 6, and 8 are the disaggregated level 
variables, such as the number of floods, storms, volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, 
landslides, other disasters in year t and in year t-1. In each table, the results in 
columns (1), (3), and (5) do not include year trends, whereas those in columns (2), (4), 
and (6) do. Outliers are included in the sample for the results shown in columns (1) and 
(2), whereas they are excluded from the sample for the results shown in columns (3), 
(4), (5), and (6). Furthermore, the sample used in columns (5) and (6) excludes outliers, 
but various control variables are included, resulting in a reduction of the sample size 
because the data of control variables are not available for some observations. 
 
4.1. Results of full sample. 
Table 3 indicates that the number of total natural disaster in years t and t-1 have 
the predicated negative sign in all estimations. Furthermore, they are statistically 
significant, with the exception of column (4). Hence, this result is congruent with 
Hypothesis 1. As for the absolute value of their coefficients, the value in year t is 
almost equivalent to that in year t-1, which suggests that the magnitude of their effect 
does not change; i.e., they are stable. Furthermore, it can be seen from columns (1)–(4) 
that the value decreased from around 0.04 to 0.01 when the time trend is controlled. In 
addition, after adding various control variables, columns (5) and (6) suggest that the 
value decreased from around 0.05 to 0.02. This is interpreted as implying that the 
occurrence of a disaster reduces incorruption by 0.01 or 0.02 points on a zero-to-six 
scale. To take an extreme case such as the United States, on average, 25 natural 
disasters occur each year. If this is true, then incorruption decreases by 0.25 points on 
a zero-to-six scale over the year. The time trend shows the significant negative sign 
and the absolute value of the coefficient is 0.06 in columns (2), (4), and (6). This implies 
that incorruption decreases worldwide by 0.06 points on a zero-to-six scale each year. 
These results can be interpreted in a number of ways. For instance, a decline of civic 
virtue possibly leads to an exaggerated report of the number of disasters with the 
intention of increasing bribery and, thus, corruption. It follows from the results of the 
number of disasters in Table 3 that natural disasters have a negative effect on 
incorruption; however, its effect is reduced by about 75% when the time trend is 
included. This means that natural disasters continue to influence incorruption even 
after removing the time trend capturing the third factors related to both incorruption 
and natural disasters. Therefore, the relationship between natural disasters and 
incorruption is not considered as the spurious correlation. 
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As for the control variables, the coefficient of GDP per capita shows a negative sign 
in columns (1), (3), and (5). However, after controlling for the time trend, it becomes 
positive in columns (2) and (4). All of them are indicated as statistically significant 
with the exception of column (6). This implies that developed countries are less corrupt 
after controlling for the time trend, which is consistent with intuition. The coefficients 
of school years and democracy show a positive sign and statistical significance at the 
1% level in columns (5) and (6). These robust results are also consistent with the 
perception that countries with high levels of education and democracy are less corrupt. 
Both the legal origin dummies and the ethnic fractionalization show a significant 
negative sign in column (5). However, their statistical significance disappears after 
including the time trend, although their signs remain negative. Hence, their effect on 
incorruption is not robust. The coefficient of the ratio of Protestants has a significant 
positive sign in columns (5) and (6). This supports the argument that predominantly 
Protestant countries are less corrupt (Gokcekus 2008). 
Table 4 presents the results of disaggregating the natural disasters. It can be seen 
that the coefficients of the number of floods and of storms have a negative positive sign 
in most cases. However, it is surprising to observe that with the exception of column (2), 
the number of floods is statistically significant, whereas that of storms is not 
significant in any column. This holds true not only for those in year t, but also for year 
t-1. As presented in columns (4) and (6), after deleting the outliers, the absolute value 
of the coefficient of the number of floods is around 0.05. Therefore, the occurrence of 
floods reduces incorruption by 0.05 points on a zero-to-six scale, whereas the 
occurrence of storms does not reduce it at all. Their effect on incorruption definitely 
differs, even though they share the same climatic characteristics. The difference 
between floods and storms is that the victims of floods are limited to people residing on 
irrigated land and in areas near rivers, waterways, lakes, or reservoirs. On the other 
hand, the victims of storms tend to reside in wider areas because the effects of storms 
extend over a greater range. In comparison with the victims of storms, the victims of 
floods are limited geographically to a specific group. Therefore, the size of this group is 
small and its collective action thought to be coordinated more easily (Olson 1965). 
Naturally, an interest group of flood victims is likely to be formed to pursue 
strategically any benefits. Furthermore, the lower probability of death resulting from 
floods, compared with that of storms, possibly leads people to reside in flood-prone 
areas strategically to obtain compensation when a flood occurs. Inevitably, the moral 
hazard problem becomes more serious when floods occur than when storms occur.  
Apart from climatic disasters, the number of volcanic eruptions produces a positive 
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sign in all columns. Furthermore, the number of volcanic eruptions in year t-1 is 
statistically significant in columns (2), (4), and (6). However, the number of volcanic 
eruptions in year t is not statistically significant with the exception of column (4). 
Therefore, the effects of volcanic eruption are not robust and, therefore, unreliable. As 
for coefficients of the number of earthquakes and landslides, their signs change 
according to the specifications, and on the timing of the disasters, i.e., in year t or year 
t-1. Furthermore, they are not statistically significant in most cases. Overall, geologic 
disasters do not influence corruption. With respect to the number of other disasters, 
this includes various types of disaster, and hence, the results can be interpreted as 
being similar to the effect of total disasters, which are reported in Table 3. The 
information presented in Table 4 supports Hypothesis 2. 
 
4.2. Estimation results based on the samples of non-OECD countries and 
OECD countries. 
 
In Table 5, the coefficient of the number total natural disasters in year t and in 
year t-1 exhibits a negative sign in all columns. It is interesting to observe that it is 
statistically significant at the 1% level in columns (1), (3), and (5), whereas it is not 
statistically significant in columns (2), (4), and (6). This suggests that controlling for 
the time trend nullifies its effect on incorruption. Measurement error is known to 
attenuate the effect of the variable. As alluded to earlier, the reported number of 
disasters in developing countries is possibly exaggerated, which results in 
measurement error. The disappearance of the significance effect of the number of 
disasters might be, in part, due to the error. Turning to Table 6, with the exception of 
column (2), the number of floods yields a significant negative sign, not only in year t 
year but also in year t-1 year. The absolute value of the coefficient is 0.04 for year t and 
0.03 for year t-1, as shown in column (4). After including various control variables, it 
becomes 0.05 in year t year as well as in year t-1. Thus, the degree of its effect is almost 
equivalent to that of Table 4. 
Considering Table 7, the coefficient of the number of total natural disasters in year 
t year, as well as in year t-1, shows a negative sign in all columns. Different from the 
results based on the non-OECD sample shown in Table 5, it is statistically significant 
in most cases with the exception of column (2) in year t-1. Furthermore, its absolute 
value is around 0.05 in all estimations. This implies that the inclusion of the time 
trend does not influence the effect of the number of disasters. Therefore, the negative 
relation between disasters and incorruption is not considered as spurious. This might 
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be, in part, because that number of disasters is measured more accurately than in 
non-OECD countries and so the attenuation bias is trivial. 
In Table 8, the number of floods yields a significant negative sign, not only in year 
t but also in year t-1, in all estimations. In most cases, its significance is at the 1% level. 
Columns (4) and (6) show that the absolute value of the coefficient of floods is reduced 
by the inclusion of the time trend. However, its value is 0.09 in year t and 0.10 in year 
t-1, implying that the occurrence of a flood reduces incorruption by 0.09 points on a 
zero-to-six scale. The degree of its effect is approximately twice that based on the 
sample of non-OECD countries. On the other hand, the number of storms is not 
statistically significant in any column, even though it shows a negative sign in columns 
(1)–(6). Floods and storms occur with similarly frequency, and so, to a certain extent, 
they can be predicted. Therefore, people can prepare measures to cope with these 
events. However, there is an obvious difference between them concerning their effect 
on incorruption. The results for earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and landslides do not 
suggest statistical significance in most cases, and therefore, they do not influence 
corruption. Concerning the number of other disasters, its coefficient shows a 
significant sign in all estimations. The number of other disasters in year t-1 is not 
statistically significant in any column, even though in year t it is statistically 
significant. Therefore, the effect of other disasters is not robust. The combined results 
of the developed countries indicate that only the occurrence of floods increases 
corruption. 
Corruption is observed to be negatively associated with economic growth (Mauro 
1995; Tanzi & Davoodi 1997; Johnson et al. 2011). However, such an observation is not 
congruent with the finding that natural disasters cause the public sector to become 
more corrupt in OECD countries than in non-OECD countries. The fact that the effect 
of floods on corruption is greater in non-OECD countries than in OECD countries can 
be interpreted as follows. Floods tend to occur in the agricultural land because 
agricultural land requires irrigation. It is difficult for farmers to move to areas where 
floods are unlikely to occur because such areas are not suited to agriculture. The 
population working in the agricultural sector is larger in developing countries than in 
developed nations. Accordingly, the opportunity for the movement of population away 
from risky areas is low in developing countries. Hence, this is the reason why people in 
these countries reside in areas at risk of floods; it tends to reflect the nature of their 
work, rather than their strategic behavior to pursue disaster compensation.  
If it is accepted that because of a disaster some individuals are dead, then clearly 
they cannot benefit from any windfalls that may be derived from the event. Costs such 
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as the expected probability of death caused by floods are lower in developed countries, 
partly because their buildings are less vulnerable to floods. Thus, the expected benefit 
resulting from the occurrence of a disaster is greater than its cost. In developed 
countries, residents in disaster-prone-areas have an incentive to continue to live there. 
Thus, under such conditions in developed countries, there is the possibility of an inflow 
of population into disaster-prone areas because “the prospect of receiving federal and 
state reconstruction assistance after the next hurricane strikes supplies incentives for 
others to relocate their homes and businesses from inland areas of comparative safely 
to vulnerable coastal areas” (Shughart II 2006, p.44). Considering what has been 
discussed thus far leads to the claim that in developed countries, people have an 
incentive to live in flood-prone areas because the expected benefits of the occurrence of 
a flood are larger than the costs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Rational individuals may possibly exploit devastating incidents such as natural 
disasters. Political rent-seeking activities possibly sacrifice direct benefits to 
disaster-hit areas in favor of self-interest. Leeson and Sobel (2008) found that 
disaster-relief windfalls increased corruption. The characteristics of disasters differ, 
and thus, they are expected to have different influences on corruption. However, little 
is known about whether the different disaster types result in different outcomes. 
Furthermore, the effects of disaster seem to be different between developed and 
developing countries. To examine this statistically, this work used panel data from 84 
countries for a 21-year period from 1990 to 2010.  
The major findings of this study are the following. (1) Natural disasters lead the 
public sector to become corrupt. (2) Floods have a significant effect on corruption; 
however, other types of disaster do not exhibit such effects. This indicates that 
disasters that are foreseeable but that do not threaten life trigger strategic behavior in 
the victims. In addition, damage is limited to specific areas, which triggers the 
formation of interest groups. That is, people living in an area in which floods occur 
frequently anticipate disaster compensation, which leads to a moral hazard problem. 
(3) The effect of disasters is greater in developed countries than in developing 
countries. These findings are observed even after controlling for the time trend, the 
characteristics of various countries, and outliers. This is consistent with the claim of 
Leeson and Sobel (2008) that climatic disasters increase corruption. The moral hazard 
problem caused by a disaster is severe if the cost of the disaster is sufficiently small, 
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such that individuals strategically opt to reside in the disaster-prone area. 
This paper uses country-level panel data and so measurement errors are thought to 
cause an estimation bias, although a robustness check is conducted in the paper. For 
closer examination about the effects of disasters on corruption, micro-level data with 
greater accuracy should be used. Furthermore, the strategic behavior of people 
regarding their choice over their residential area should be scrutinized more closely by 
using experimental methods. These remaining issues require further investigation in 
future studies. 
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Figure 1. Change in degree of incorruption and occurrence of natural disasters. 
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Figure 2. Relation between occurrence of natural disasters and incorruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 3. Composition of number of natural disasters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Figure 4. Average death toll per disaster (number of deaths / number of disasters) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 1. Characteristics of disasters. 
 Flood Storm Earthquake Volcanic Landslide 
Expected cost  Very small 
 
Small 
 
 Very large 
 
 Very Small 
    
Very Small 
 
Risk 
 
Property Property Life and property Property Property 
Type Climatic 
(Frequent) 
Climatic 
(Frequent) 
 
Geologic 
    (Rare) 
Geologic 
    (Rare) 
Geologic 
  (Rare) 
Exposed area and people 
 
Restricted Extensive   Extensive Restricted Restricted 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 2. Comparison of average value of each variable between non-OECD and OECD countries. 
 Definition and unit Full sample 
    (1) 
Non-OECD 
    (2) 
  OECD 
    (3) 
Incorruption  
  
1 (Corrupt)–6 (Incorrupt)     3.15 
   (1.39) 
2.60 
 (1.04) 
4.70 
(1.02) 
Number of total natural 
disasters  
 
 3.01 
(4.35) 
2.85 
(3.64) 
      3.45 
      (5.91) 
Number of floods  
 
 1.03 
(1.69) 
      1.08 
      (1.69) 
      0.91 
      (1.68) 
Number of storms  
 
 0.83 
(2.24) 
      0.55 
      (1.35) 
      1.62 
      (3.65) 
Number of earthquakes  
 
 0.19 
(0.60) 
      0.19 
      (0.62) 
      0.17 
      (0.53) 
Number of volcanic eruptions  
 
 0.06 
(0.32) 
      0.08 
      (0.35) 
      0.02 
      (0.17) 
Number of landslides  0.13 
(0.47) 
      0.16 
      (0.53) 
      0.04 
      (0.23) 
Number of other disasters 
 
 0.74 
(1.29) 
0.76 
(1.29) 
      0.67 
      (1.30) 
GDP per capita 
 
10 thousand US$ 0.81 
(1.04) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
2.29 
(0.82) 
Population 
 
Million 4.59 
(12.4) 
4.77 
(13.9) 
4.08 
(6.47) 
Land area  
 
Million m2 9.83 
(19.9) 
7.63 
(13.7) 
16.0 
(31.2) 
Schooling years 
 
Log of 1 + average years of school 
attainment in 1980 
    1.60 
    (0.53) 
1.40 
  (0.44)   
     2.19 
    (0.27) 
  
Democracy 
 
1 (Undemocratic)–10 
(Democratic) 
    5.26 
    (3.17) 
     3.86 
     (2.32) 
9.24 
(1.40) 
French legal origin dummy 
 
     0.50 0.56 0.35 
English legal origin dummy 
 
 
 
    0.37 0.51 0.32 
Ethnic fractionalization 
 
The larger the value, the more 
ethnically heterogeneous the 
society is. 
0.44 
    0.27) 
0.51 
(0.25) 
0.24 
(0.21) 
Ratio of Protestants 
 
%    14.1 
   (20.6) 
     9.40 
    (12.4) 
     27.5 
     (30.9) 
Observations 
 
 1348      997      351 
Notes: Values in parentheses are standard deviations. Sample that did not exclude countries considered as outliers whose 
average number of total disasters is over 10. 
Sources: Incorruption data is gathered from Corruption Index of International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). Data 
concerning natural disasters were obtained from http://www.emdat.be. (accessed on August 20, 2013). 
Schooling years are used in Easterly and Ross (1997). The data are available from 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20700002~pagePK:64214
825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html (accessed June 2, 2011). Data on ethnic fractionalization is available 
at http://www.econ.upf.edu/~reynal/data_web.htm (accessed on June 1, 2011). French legal and English legal origin 
dummies and measure of democracy are available at http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset 
(accessed on June 1, 2011). All other data used in this paper are gathered from the World Bank (2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 3. Effect of aggregated disasters on incorruption (Random Effect Panel Tobit Estimations): Full sample 
 (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) 
Number of total natural 
disasters in year t. 
-0.04*** 
(-4.68) 
-0.01* 
(-1.80) 
-0.04*** 
(-4.31) 
-0.01 
(-1.56) 
-0.05*** 
(-4.52) 
-0.02** 
(-2.18) 
Number of total disasters in 
year t-1. 
-0.04*** 
(-5.20) 
-0.01* 
(-1.81) 
-0.05*** 
(-4.67) 
-0.01 
(-1.52) 
-0.06*** 
(-5.09) 
-0.02** 
(-2.15) 
GDP per capita 
 
-1.02*** 
(-8.49) 
0.34*** 
(3.33) 
-1.02*** 
(-8.54) 
0.31*** 
(2.86) 
-1.13*** 
(-8.48) 
0.14 
(-1.28) 
Population 
 
-0.02** 
(-2.01) 
0.003 
(0.05) 
-0.23*** 
(-5.76) 
-0.004 
(-0.14) 
-0.09*** 
(-2.62) 
0.002 
(0.09) 
Land area 
 
0.03** 
(2.30) 
0.01 
(1.09) 
0.02* 
(1.77) 
0.01 
(0.93) 
0.02*** 
(3.04) 
0.01* 
(1.79) 
Trend 
 
 -0.06*** 
(-18.3) 
 -0.06*** 
(-17.2) 
 -0.06*** 
(-13.7) 
Schooling years 
 
    0.91** 
(2.08) 
0.94*** 
(3.43) 
Democracy 
 
    0.33*** 
(4.52) 
0.16*** 
(3.41) 
French legal origin dummy     -1.63*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.22 
(-0.58) 
English legal origin dummy     -1.86*** 
(-3.10) 
-0.48 
(-1.28) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
 
    -1.19* 
(-1.96) 
-0.49 
(-1.29) 
Ratio of Protestants     0.01* 
(1.17) 
0.01*** 
(3.23) 
Constant 4.17*** 3.59*** 4.66*** 3.65*** 3.13*** 1.87*** 
  
 (14.4) (24.8) (15.0) (22.7) (3.25) (3.12) 
Outliers 
 
Included Included Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Observations 
 
1647 1647 1552 1552  1272  1272 
Left-censored observations 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Right-censored observations   94   94   94   94   72   72 
Log likelihood function –1942 –1802 –1804 –1685 –1467 –1384 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
 
  
Table 4. Effect of disaggregated disasters on incorruption (Random Effect Panel Tobit Estimations): Full sample 
 (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) 
Number of floods in year t. -0.06*** 
(-4.10) 
-0.01 
(-1.02) 
-0.10*** 
(-5.18) 
-0.04** 
(-2.39) 
-0.12*** 
(-5.40) 
-0.06*** 
(-2.78) 
Number of storms in year t. -0.01 
(-0.87) 
-0.001 
(-0.12) 
-0.01 
(-0.26) 
0.01 
(0.71) 
-0.01 
(-0.48) 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
Number of earthquakes in 
year t. 
0.02 
(0.76) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
0.09* 
(1.93) 
0.06 
(1.42) 
0.07 
(1.53) 
0.04 
(0.98) 
Number of volcanic eruptions 
in year t. 
0.06 
(0.97) 
0.07 
(1.12) 
0.13 
(1.57) 
0.15* 
(1.87) 
0.11 
(1.36) 
0.12 
(1.49) 
Number of landslides -0.05 
(-1.13) 
-0.02 
(-0.51) 
-0.01 
(-0.27) 
-0.01 
(-0.31) 
-0.04 
(-0.74) 
-0.04 
(-0.66) 
Number of other disasters in 
year t. 
-0.06*** 
(-3.57) 
-0.04** 
(-2.43) 
-0.06*** 
(-2.99) 
-0.03* 
(-1.95) 
-0.06*** 
(-2.82) 
-0.04* 
(-1.86) 
Number of floods in year t-1. -0.07*** 
(-4.40) 
-0.02 
(-1.34) 
-0.10*** 
(-5.25) 
-0.05** 
(-2.54) 
-0.12*** 
(-5.70) 
-0.06*** 
(-3.00) 
Number of storms in year t-1. -0.01 
(-0.90) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
-0.01 
(-0.22) 
0.02 
(0.91) 
-0.01 
(-0.68) 
0.002 
(0.08) 
Number of earthquakes in 
year t-1. 
-0.01 
(-0.16) 
-0.02 
(-0.65) 
0.06 
(1.25) 
0.03 
(0.81) 
0.05 
(1.11) 
0.03 
(0.66) 
Number of volcanic eruptions 
in year t-1. 
0.11 
(1.53) 
0.13** 
(2.00) 
0.14 
(1.60) 
0.18** 
(2.16) 
0.13 
(1.45) 
0.16* 
(1.82) 
Number of landslides in year 
t-1. 
-0.05 
(-1.27) 
-0.03 
(-0.77) 
0.04 
(0.74) 
0.04 
(0.71) 
0.01 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(0.33) 
Number of other disasters in 
year t-1. 
–0.06*** 
(–3.75) 
–0.03** 
(–2.08) 
–0.07*** 
(–3.53) 
–0.03** 
(–1.97) 
–0.07*** 
(–3.29) 
–0.04* 
(–1.86) 
Trend 
 
 -0.06*** 
(-17.7) 
 -0.06*** 
(-16.2) 
 -0.05*** 
(-12.4) 
  
Control variables included 
 
 Column (1) 
of Table 2 
Column (2) 
of Table 2 
Column (3) 
of Table 2 
Column (4) 
of Table 2 
Column (5) 
of Table 2 
Column (6) of 
Table 2 
Outliers 
 
Included Included Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Observations 
 
1647 1647 1552 1552  1272  1272 
Left-censored observations 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Right-censored observations   94   94   94   94   72   72 
Log likelihood function –1930 –1795 –1779 –1670 –1443 –1373 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5. Effect of aggregated disasters on incorruption (Random Effect Panel Tobit Estimations): Sample of non-OECD 
countries  
 (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) 
Number of total natural 
disasters in year t. 
-0.04*** 
(-4.13) 
-0.01 
(-1.34) 
-0.04*** 
(-3.54) 
-0.01 
(-1.08) 
-0.05*** 
(-3.46) 
-0.02 
(-1.39) 
Number of total disasters in 
year t-1. 
-0.05*** 
(-5.30) 
-0.02** 
(-1.98) 
-0.05*** 
(-4.08) 
-0.01 
(-1.21) 
-0.06*** 
(-4.20) 
-0.02 
(-1.63) 
GDP per capita 
 
-0.22 
(-1.32) 
0.45*** 
(3.40) 
-0.34** 
(-1.98) 
0.44*** 
(3.32) 
-0.42** 
(-2.14) 
0.32** 
(2.06) 
Population 
 
0.01 
(1.05) 
0.01 
(1.16) 
-0.12*** 
(-3.53) 
-0.004 
(-0.17) 
-0.07** 
(-2.12) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
Land area 
 
0.002 
(0.31) 
-0.003 
(-0.51) 
0.01 
(1.64) 
-0.002 
(-0.30) 
0.02** 
(2.04) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
Trend 
 
 -0.05*** 
(-14.4) 
 -0.05*** 
(-13.8) 
 -0.05*** 
(-11.3) 
Schooling years 
 
    0.67** 
(2.07) 
0.48* 
(1.85) 
Democracy 
 
    0.10** 
(1.77) 
0.10** 
(2.32) 
French legal origin dummy     -0.98 
(-1.63) 
-0.56 
(-1.17) 
English legal origin dummy     -0.69 
(-1.12) 
-0.70 
(-1.41) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
 
    -0.48 
(-1.06) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
Ratio of Protestants     -0.01 
(-1.35) 
0.001 
(0.26) 
Constant 2.88*** 3.10*** 3.12*** 3.12*** 2.91*** 2.63*** 
  
 (21.6) (28.2) (19.3) (26.3) (3.52) (3.99) 
Outliers 
 
Included Included Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Observations 
 
1249 1249 1173 1173  940  940 
Left-censored observations 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Right-censored observations    0    0    0    0    0    0 
Log likelihood function –1489 –1393 –1381 –1294 –1126 –1067 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
Table 6. Effect of disaggregated disasters on incorruption (Random Effect Panel Tobit Estimations): Sample of non-OECD 
countries 
 (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) 
Number of floods in year t. -0.06*** 
(-3.25) 
-0.01 
(-0.63) 
-0.10*** 
(-4.45) 
-0.04* 
(-1.72) 
-0.12*** 
(-4.41) 
-0.05* 
(-1.93) 
Number of storms in year t. -0.01 
(-0.63) 
0.01 
(0.33) 
0.001 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.76) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
0.003 
(0.10) 
Number of earthquakes in 
year t. 
0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(-0.43) 
0.09 
(1.57) 
0.06 
(1.21) 
0.07 
(1.19) 
0.04 
(0.80) 
Number of volcanic eruptions 
in year t. 
0.05 
(0.74) 
0.07 
(1.00) 
0.11 
(1.17) 
0.13 
(1.57) 
0.11 
(1.20) 
0.13 
(1.42) 
Number of landslides 
 
-0.04 
(-0.90) 
-0.02 
(-0.50) 
-0.01 
(-0.08) 
-0.01 
(-0.23) 
-0.30 
(-0.46) 
-0.03 
(-0.45) 
Number of other disasters in 
year t. 
-0.06*** 
(-2.96) 
-0.03* 
(-1.86) 
-0.04** 
(-2.18) 
-0.03 
(-1.44) 
-0.04* 
(-1.81) 
-0.02 
(-1.18) 
Number of floods in year t-1. -0.07*** 
(-3.88) 
-0.01 
(-0.84) 
-0.10*** 
(-4.40) 
-0.03* 
(-1.66) 
-0.12*** 
(-4.52) 
-0.05** 
(-1.99) 
Number of storms in year t-1. -0.02 
(-0.99) 
-0.01 
(-0.38) 
-0.003 
(-0.10) 
0.02 
(0.74) 
-0.03 
(-0.77) 
-0.003 
(-0.10) 
Number of earthquakes in 
year t-1. 
-0.03 
(-0.76) 
-0.05 
(-1.32) 
0.04 
(0.72) 
0.01 
(0.36) 
0.03 
(0.54) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
Number of volcanic eruptions 
in year t-1.. 
0.11 
(1.44) 
0.13* 
(1.85) 
0.15 
(1.53) 
0.19** 
(2.08) 
0.16 
(1.57) 
0.19* 
(1.94) 
Number of landslides in year 
t-1. 
-0.04 
(-0.87) 
-0.02 
(-0.58) 
0.06 
(0.91) 
0.05 
(0.81) 
0.04 
(0.56) 
0.04 
(0.59) 
Number of other disasters in 
year t-1. 
–0.06*** 
(–3.38) 
–0.03* 
(–1.92) 
–0.06*** 
(–2.96) 
–0.03* 
(–1.79) 
–0.06** 
(–2.49) 
–0.03 
(–1.53) 
Trend  -0.05***  -0.05***  -0.05*** 
  
 (-14.3) (-13.1) (-10.4) 
Control variables included 
 
 Column (1) 
of Table 2 
Column (2) 
of Table 2 
Column (3) 
of Table 2 
Column (4) 
of Table 2 
Column (5) 
of Table 2 
Column (6) of 
Table 2 
Outliers 
 
Included Included Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Observations 
 
1249 1249 1173 1173  940  940 
Left-censored observations 19 19 19 19 19 19 
Right-censored observations    0    0    0    0    0    0 
Log likelihood function –1482 –1387 –1363 –1284 –1110 –1059 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7. Effect of aggregated disasters on incorruption (Random Effect Panel Tobit Estimations): Sample of OECD countries  
 (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) 
Number of total natural 
disasters in year t. 
-0.04*** 
(-3.03) 
-0.04*** 
(-3.17) 
-0.06*** 
(-2.80) 
-0.05** 
(-2.56) 
-0.05*** 
(-2.61) 
-0.05** 
(-2.48) 
Number of total disasters in 
year t-1. 
-0.03** 
(-2.15) 
-0.02 
(-1.54) 
-0.05*** 
(-2.73) 
-0.04* 
(-1.89) 
-0.05** 
(-2.59) 
-0.04* 
(-1.92) 
GDP per capita 
 
-1.49*** 
(-12.2) 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
-1.46*** 
(-11.8) 
-0.002 
(0.01) 
-1.59*** 
(-11.8) 
-0.54*** 
(2.89) 
Population 
 
0.003 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(-0.32) 
-0.30** 
(-2.24) 
-0.13** 
(-2.14) 
0.10* 
(1.91) 
0.03 
(0.89) 
Land area 
 
0.01 
(0.67) 
0.01 
(1.22) 
0.004 
(0.24) 
0.01 
(1.11) 
0.004 
(0.62) 
0.01 
(1.04) 
Trend 
 
 -0.09*** 
(-9.56) 
 -0.09*** 
(-9.31) 
 -0.07*** 
(-6.77) 
Schooling years 
 
    0.08 
(0.09) 
0.54 
(0.73) 
Democracy 
 
    0.27* 
(1.66) 
0.01 
(0.13) 
French legal origin dummy     -1.38*** 
(-2.79) 
-0.42 
(-1.04) 
English legal origin dummy     -1.40*** 
(-2.97) 
-0.38 
(-0.99) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
 
    1.43 
(1.65) 
0.76 
(1.11) 
Ratio of Protestants     0.03*** 
(4.35) 
0.02*** 
(4.90) 
Constant 
 
8.82*** 
(15.8) 
6.08*** 
(15.1) 
9.53*** 
(14.8) 
6.46*** 
(15.3) 
5.49*** 
(2.97) 
4.90*** 
(3.42) 
  
Outliers 
 
Included Included Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Observations 
 
398 398 379 379  332  332 
Left-censored observations 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Right-censored observations   94   94   94   94   72   72 
Log likelihood function –373 –338 –354 –322 –300 –279 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
  
Table 8. Effect of disaggregated disasters on incorruption (Random Effect Panel Tobit Estimations): Sample of 
OECD countries 
 (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5)   (6) 
Number of floods in year t. -0.09*** 
(-3.64) 
-0.07*** 
(-2.84) 
-0.12*** 
(-3.52) 
-0.09*** 
(-2.70) 
-0.12*** 
(-3.44) 
-0.09*** 
(-2.75) 
Number of storms in year t. -0.02 
(-1.18) 
-0.03* 
(-1.95) 
-0.02 
(-0.93) 
-0.04 
(-1.41) 
-0.01 
(-0.58) 
-0.03 
(-1.08) 
Number of earthquakes in 
year t. 
0.09 
(1.22) 
0.06 
(0.94) 
0.15* 
(1.84) 
0.12 
(1.57) 
0.13 
(1.49) 
0.10 
(1.29) 
Number of volcanic eruptions 
in year t. 
0.25 
(1.25) 
0.05 
(0.31) 
0.24 
(1.18) 
0.09 
(0.46) 
0.27 
(1.26) 
0.11 
(0.56) 
Number of landslides. 
 
-0.07 
(-0.53) 
-0.10 
(-0.75) 
-0.06 
(-0.43) 
-0.07 
(-0.55) 
-0.06 
(-0.43) 
-0.08 
(-0.55) 
Number of other disasters in 
year t. 
-0.07** 
(-2.15) 
-0.05* 
(-1.71) 
-0.13*** 
(-2.78) 
-0.09** 
(-2.02) 
-0.13*** 
(-2.63) 
-0.09** 
(-2.00) 
Number of floods in year t-1. -0.09*** 
(-3.34) 
-0.05** 
(-2.17) 
-0.14*** 
(-4.00) 
-0.10*** 
(-2.88) 
-0.14*** 
(-3.90) 
-0.10*** 
(-2.95) 
Number of storms in year t-1. -0.02 
(-1.15) 
-0.02 
(-1.35) 
-0.01 
(-0.63) 
-0.02 
(-0.88) 
-0.01 
(-0.32) 
-0.02 
(-0.64) 
Number of earthquakes in 
year t-1. 
0.08 
(1.19) 
0.07 
(1.08) 
0.15* 
(1.94) 
.0.12 
(1.64) 
0.15* 
(1.77) 
0.12 
(1.54) 
Number of volcanic eruptions 
in year t-1. 
0.11 
(0.59) 
0.05 
(0.32) 
-0.03 
(-0.15) 
-0.06 
(-0.34) 
-0.01 
(-0.06) 
-0.06 
(-0.33) 
Number of landslides in year 
t-1. 
-0.05 
(-0.37) 
-0.06 
(-0.50) 
-0.02 
(-0.20) 
-0.05 
(-0.38) 
-0.01 
(-0.11) 
-0.05 
(-0.38) 
Number of other disasters in 
year t-1. 
–0.07** 
(–1.98) 
–0.02 
(–0.82) 
–0.12** 
(–2.58) 
–0.06 
(–1.39) 
–0.12** 
(–2.49) 
–0.07 
(–1.50) 
Trend  -0.08***  -0.08***  -0.06*** 
  
 (-8.91) (-8.01) (-5.60) 
Control variables included 
 
 Column (1) 
of Table 2 
Column (2) 
of Table 2 
Column (3) 
of Table 2 
Column (4) 
of Table 2 
Column (5) 
of Table 2 
Column (6) of 
Table 2 
Outliers 
 
Included Included Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded 
Observations 
 
398 398 379 379  332  332 
Left-censored observations 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Right-censored observations   94   94   94   94   72   72 
Log likelihood function –364 –333 –341 –315 –287 –273 
Note: Values in parentheses are z-statistics. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
  
Appendix: List of countries used in the analysis 
Number Country Number Country 
1 Argentina 51 The Netherlands 
2 Australia 52 New Zealand 
3 Austria 53 Nicaragua 
4 Bangladesh 54 Niger 
5 Belgium 55 Nigeria 
6 Bolivia 56 Norway 
7 Brazil 57 Oman 
8 Burkina Faso 58 Pakistan 
9 Cameroon 59 Panama 
10 Canada 60 Papua New Guinea 
11 Chile 61 Paraguay 
12 China 62 Peru 
13 Colombia 63 Philippines 
14 Congo, Dem. 64 Portugal 
15 Congo, Rep. 65 Senegal 
16 Costa Rica 66 Sierra Leone 
17 Cote d'Ivoire 67 Singapore 
18 Denmark 68 South Africa 
19 Dominican  69 Spain 
20 Ecuador 70 Sri Lanka 
21 Egypt 71 Sudan 
22 El Salvador 72 Sweden 
23 Finland 73 Switzerland 
24 France 74 Syrian 
25 Gabon 75 Thailand 
26 Ghana 76 Togo 
27 Greece 77 Trinidad and Tobago 
28 Guatemala 78 Tunisia 
29 Guyana 79 United Kingdom 
30 Haiti 80 United States 
31 Honduras 81 Uruguay 
32 Hong Kong 82 Venezuela 
33 Hungary 83 Zambia 
34 India 84 Zimbabwe 
35 Indonesia   
36 Ireland   
37 Israel   
38 Italy   
39 Japan   
40 Kenya   
  
41 S. Korea   
42 Kuwait   
43 Liberia   
44 Libya   
45 Luxembourg   
46 Madagascar   
47 Malawi   
48 Malaysia   
49 Mexico   
50 Morocco   
 
 
 
